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AbstrAct
The breakdown of the financial markets in 2007 and the ensuing debt crisis in the EU has produced enor-
mous mistrust in financial products and the monetary system. The emergence of shadow banking also 
changed the behavior patterns of management so that its self-interest dominated the interests of sharehold-
ers and the other stakeholders. These false incentives led to merger processes in the financial system result-
ing in market structures in which single institutions became too big or too connected to fail. The empirical 
developments and the political counter-measures described in this article point to the fact that the macro-
perspective has been dominant, neglecting individual irresponsibility and failure.
Key words: capital funding, corporate social responsibility, financial markets, principal agent problems, risk 
management
resumen
La caída de los mercados financieros en 2007 y la subsecuente crisis de la deuda en Estados Unidos produje-
ron una enorme desconfianza en los productos financieros y en el sistema monetario. El surgimiento del 
sector bancario en la sombra (shadow banking), también ha cambiado los patrones de conducta de la adminis-
tración, de manera tal que los intereses de esta última dominaron los de los accionistas y otros tenedores de 
acciones. Estos falsos incentivos llevaron a fusionar procesos en el sistema financiero que tuvieron como re-
sultado el surgimiento de estructuras mercantiles por medio de las cuales cada institución por separado se 
hizo demasiado grande o demasiado cercana al fracaso. Los desarrollos empíricos y las contramedidas polí-
ticas descritos en este artículo apuntan hacia el hecho de que ha dominado la perspectiva macro, lo que de 
algún modo niega la irresponsabilidad y el fracaso individuales.
Palabras clave: Fondeo de capital, responsabilidad social corporativa, mercados financieros, problemas del 
agente principal, administración de riesgos
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IntroductIon
The financial system, consisting of financial markets, banks, and insurance firms, has 
always been heavily dependent on its clients’ confidence in the sustainability of the 
financial products it provides. Hence, financial products have often been character-
ized as credence goods where “the sellers act as experts determining the customers’ 
requirements” (Emons, 1997). The functional capability of such markets is only pre-
served if the sellers in a mid- and long-term ensure the quality of the products supplied 
and are able to overcome the temptation to exploit the existing information asymme-
try in their short-term interests to maximize their own income and wealth. The concept 
of corporate social responsibility (csr), developed in a long process of professional 
experience, has delivered a value base for intrinsic motivation, which has been a 
certain guarantee for consumer protection. If mutual trust is eroded more and more 
by a growing number of unsound sellers, financial markets become inoperable.
The emergence of the unregulated shadow banking system (Stein, 2010) and the 
subprime credit crisis (Diamond and Rajan, 2009; Mishkin, 2011) have often been 
mentioned as the most important causes for the global financial crisis. Therefore, es-
pecially macro-prudential approaches to financial regulation have been proposed 
(Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein, 2011). But as significant as the macro-perspective might 
be, individual misbehavior of market agents is another important fact: the vastly in-
creasing number of market-based financial institutions has required the engagement 
of a large staff that is obviously quite differently motivated and much more extrinsi-
cally oriented than their peers at conventional banks, who are subject to higher risks 
to their reputations. Sellers’ interests in the form of high salaries and bonuses became 
dominant, and this behavior has also infected the staff’s behavior within the conven-
tional banking system. Not only have the Basel accords, government supervision, 
and regulation alone failed to work but the self-regulation through csr totally collapsed. 
The long-term functioning of financial markets has been sacrificed for the sake of 
short-term selfish interests of management and staff.
Apart from the predominately macro-orientated mainstream publications on 
the causes of the global financial crisis, this article sheds light on the individual re-
sponsibilities of principals and agents. We will demonstrate that the behavioral as-
sumptions of institutional economics deliver not only an adequate diagnosis for the 
micro-prudential causes of the global financial crisis, but also arguments for therapy. 
Before the latter is highlighted in more detail, we briefly describe the basic role of the 
financial sector as an important economic intermediary in section 2. Section 3 draws 
an alternative picture of the crisis, namely the abundant liquidity in global financial 
markets, stressing the role of financial innovations and emerging shadow banking 
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as well as the simultaneous euro implementation with its impacts on the public debt 
in single eurozone member countries. As already mentioned, section 4 contributes 
some background explanations derived from institutional economics and risk man-
agement. Section 5 draws some important conclusions for developing more reliable 
national as well as international financial markets.
socIAl responsIbIlIty, the monetAry system, And the crIsIs
Without doubt the monetary sector plays an important role in the growth processes 
in highly developed countries. In real life, the risk always exists that the power of 
one sector could become dominant and even endanger the future development of a 
well-balanced societal system. Hence, a first step must be to enumerate the specifics 
of social responsibility; a second step is to determine the role of the monetary system 
in democratically-steered market economies; and a third step is to identify the causes 
of the crisis of the financial markets. 
IndIvIduAl responsIbIlIty, cApItAl formAtIon, 
And economIc Agents’ behAvIor
The concepts of social responsibility are closely connected with the ethical founda-
tions of open societies. Following the approach of methodological individualism in 
the philosophy of science, open societies are defined as societies with decentralized 
democratic decision making and a well-balanced market system, which ensure a dynamic 
equilibrium between the social goals (peace, liberty, welfare, and justice) and the so-
cial instruments (family, morality, law, and market) (for details see Petersen, 1993 
and 2004; and Petersen and Mueller, 1999). In such a society, individual property 
rights play a decisive role. The individuals act in barter or market transactions and 
generate individual income, which is partly consumed and partly saved if the indi-
viduals possess sufficient human capital (e.g., a high level of vocational education) 
(Petersen, 2012a; 2012b).
Savings are accumulated over time and generate equity capital, which can be 
invested in additional human capital (through further education) or in real capital 
(e.g., farmland or industrial investments). Capable people become entrepreneurs 
when they invest capital they have generated by their own work. Besides income 
from labor, capital income is another income source, which ensures the further exis-
tence of an individual person. It should come as no surprise that such an individual 
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tries to sustain his/her equity capital and as far as possible even to increase it: the 
individual acts in self-responsibility. In a family context, savings and equity capital 
play a dynamic role because parents (or forebears) not only take care of themselves 
but also of the children and grandchildren (or the successors); this is the so-called 
intergenerational responsibility. In more complex modern societies with elaborate 
institutional settings like large corporations in the private sector and representative-
ly organized democratic institutions, the reciprocity within the family is extended to 
the whole society, in which strong society members take care of the less capable 
members by implementing transfers based on altruistic elements. This also reflects 
ideas on social responsibility and solidarity. Hence, individual property rights over 
equity capital are complemented by social liability, which at least in some countries 
is even expressed in the constitution.1 This social liability has been the basis for the 
development of the concept of corporate social responsibility, described in more de-
tail below (section 4).
In complex, democratically-ruled societies, in addition to the citizens, who are 
the principals in both the political and economic spheres, the corporate and the gov-
ernment sectors must serve citizens’ individual interests. Managers in private cor-
porations as well as banks, insurances companies, and public institutions are the 
agents, controlled via competition in more or less efficient markets or elections in the 
political setting. The principals need the best information to evaluate the quality of 
agents’ performance and to control their actions. If information is asymmetric in fa-
vor of agents and control is insufficient, principal-agent problems (pap) arise, jeopar-
dizing well-being in entire societies. 
Agents start to hide risk and misinform the principals, and decision making re-
garding investment of equity capital and involvement in public affairs becomes 
highly difficult. Hence, institutional arrangements (public regulations or self-regula-
tion) to ensure transparency in economic and political markets are of utmost rele-
vance for preventing agents from deploying exploitation strategies against the prin-
cipals. If efficient regulations are sorely missing, fraud and corruption destroy 
fairness and justice, leading to mistrust in governance in the private and public sec-
tor, respectively.
Concrete behavioral problems occur if the responsibility for capital is trans-
ferred from the owner (shareholder or principals) to management (ceos or agents). 
Because of asymmetric information, the management can develop its own interests, 
which could at least partly be in conflict with the owners’ interests. If management 
1  See, e.g., the German Grundgesetz Article 14,2: “Property entails obligations. Its use shall also serve the 
public good.” The concept of the social market economy is closely connected with the common welfare 
obligation of private property.
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contracts are short-term, reporting and controlling can be misused to exaggerate the 
current profit line; that positive picture is then used as justification for salary in-
creases and additional bonuses, meaning higher costs for the future and even endan-
gering the further existence of the entire company. Then the individual behavior of 
the managers (ceos of banks, insurance companies, and rating agencies, asset man-
agers, etc.) conflicts with the collective equity capital interests of the shareholders –
in the literature such problems have been discussed in terms of rationality traps, 
prisoners’ dilemma, or agents’ moral hazard behavior.
With the global financial crisis in mind, responsibility does not fall on agents 
alone. Short-term chances for enormous profits have also infected the behavior of the 
principals: greed and mammonism have dominated over traditional principles for 
sound investments. High-interest yields were not understood as indicators for high 
risks, but for handsome profits and rapid property growth. Therefore, the spirit of 
the time was to blow up the property bubble until it burst. All rational control mech-
anisms have been overruled by individual misbehavior.                            
If the whole financial system is playing Russian roulette and creating “casino 
capitalism” (Sinn, 2009), there is only a very limited chance for the legal system to 
control misbehavior and fraud. There are not enough district attorneys and expert 
investigators to monitor almost the entire national banking and insurance system 
and especially not their international connections. A constitutional democracy with 
all its institutions is unable to absorb the shocks of a moral breakdown within a whole 
economic sector. Therefore, principals as well as agents have to be seriously remind-
ed that both must act in an ethically correct manner if the functioning of financial 
markets and the trust in their products are to be ensured for future generations. 
Therefore, public regulation has to be supplemented by self-regulation of the sellers 
and buyers in the financial markets, both of whom also have a fundamental interest 
in the (long-term) sustainability of financial markets.
the fundAmentAl role of money, credIt, 
And bAnkIng In mArket economIes
The modern monetary system is a fundamental invention of mankind. The welfare 
of a society is created in the productive sectors, that is, the primary (agricultural) 
and secondary (industrial) sectors. With increasing division of labor and specializa-
tion, the complexity of a society increases enormously, so that a highly developed 
monetary sector, as an important part of the tertiary sector, is a basic prerequisite for 
improving a society’s growth potential. The implementation of a monetary system 
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dramatically reduces the transaction costs of a barter economy and works almost as 
a “lubricant” for further development. There is no doubt about it: the financial sector 
has contributed substantially to the welfare gains in highly developed societies.
But, as usual, there is a reverse side of the coin: a monetary system has to play a 
supportive role for the economic process because well-being is predominantly cre-
ated by the primary and secondary sectors. While in the primary and secondary sec-
tors the equity capital of the business owner (sole trader or shareholder) dominates, 
the financial sector is much more dependent on deposits and borrowed funds: the 
Basel II Accord demands minimum capital requirements to secure a bank’s solvency, 
which has to be between 1.6 and 12.5 percent depending on the individual risks 
structure. Furthermore bank capital is difficult to define and highly volatile. Since 
banks predominantly work with borrowed capital, conflicts of interest emerge, 
which have been described by modern institutional economics and were already 
mentioned above: the pap and moral hazard.
In a macroeconomic view, net savings take place in households, while the busi-
ness and the government sectors are usually debtors. In other words, the business sec-
tor (including the banks) is acting with more or less borrowed money while the state is 
totally dependent on taxpayers’ money. Therefore, in both sectors the hazard exists 
that the agents (bank managers, politicians, and bureaucrats) acting with borrowed 
capital might handle it more carelessly than the principals (capital owner or taxpayer) 
would with their own capital. If this kind of behavior becomes dominant, societies are 
confronted with market and government failures, which jeopardize well-being and 
future development. Hence, democratically-controlled state and international regula-
tions for the financial sector (the banking and insurance system) are necessary to pro-
tect investors and owners of capital (the principals) against exploitation by the manag-
ers of the financial sector (the agents), who in reality often show moral-hazard behavior 
by taking too many risks with borrowed capital. But as mentioned above, agents’ 
long-term interests must be stressed, even if that would mean fewer salary hikes and 
bonuses in the short run. Management contracts and remuneration have to be orient-
ed to the long term to create a certain job security and personal responsibility so that 
short-term income interests are dominated by long-term reasoning.
 
cAuses of the crIsIs  – too bIg And too connected to fAIl
A modern, efficient financial sector steered by responsible financial managers acting in 
the interests of the capital owner but also in their own personal profit interests remains 
an important target of national and international economic policy and regulation. The 
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abolishment of capital transaction controls and the globalization process have broad-
ened the financial markets, created new financial products, and have allowed new 
types of financial institutions to emerge, less or almost totally unregulated by national 
supervisory authorities. Especially in the United States, a shadow banking system emerged, 
which gained tremendously in relevance and even started to dominate the classical 
banking structures. In such an environment, “subprime mortgages” (in reality an irre-
sponsible pyramid or Ponzi scheme) could be “invented” (Mishkin, 2011), which almost 
destroyed the monetary system in the 2008 crisis. The exaggerated risk behavior of U.S. 
shadow banks, which initially created high profits, has also infected that of the Euro-
pean banks, who founded their own investment branches in the U.S. 
From a short-term perspective, even very dubious profits made by extreme risk-
taking increase the rate of return, which induces rising market capitalization in stock 
markets. If conventional banks do not follow suit, they lose in market capitalization 
and are in danger of a hostile takeover. Therefore, more and more banks had to take 
increasing risk positions to survive in a wildly accelerating footrace for a better com-
petitive position, finally leading into the near collapse of the financial system. This 
process was accompanied by a long-term policy of cheap money in the U.S. created 
by the Federal Reserve System policy and initiated by Alan Greenspan. In Europe, 
the euro introduced in 1999 also gave rise to the fact that at least in some member 
states (especially the Giipsc states: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus), 
the interest rate dropped dramatically. This resulted in greatly increasing public debt 
levels, especially after the 2008 crisis, which led into the eurozone’s 2011 crisis.
The broadening of financial markets has increased the pressures on banks and 
insurance companies to move into business segments formerly in the hands of special-
ized financial institutions (like investment banks, private equity funds, hedge funds, 
etc.). Even German banks with a very good reputation for small- and mid-market ser-
vices temporarily lost interest in this segment and concentrated on big firms and in-
vestment banking services. The short-termed windfalls induced a process of mergers 
that substantially increased market concentration, posing a threat for future competi-
tion. Simultaneously, the international connections intensified because of new finan-
cial products created and bought by conventional banks.2 Similar processes have tak-
en place all over the world resulting in “systemic” banks. On the one hand, these 
institutions are considered too big to fail, because bankruptcy of a single bank would 
now endanger the existence of the national financial system. On the other hand, these 
institutions are also too internationally connected to fail, which would endanger the 
supranational or even global financial system. All this was accompanied by more or 
2 For the increase in connectedness after the crisis, see Pelizzon (2014).
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less inefficient supervisory mechanisms, especially totally insufficiently regulated rat-
ing agencies, which are private firms. This led to an increasing number of experts and 
citizens losing confidence in financial institutions despite the fact that financial prod-
ucts are predominantly “credence goods” as mentioned above.
the empIrIcAl pIctures of the crIsIs
The international capital markets have been characterized by high and increasing li-
quidity in recent decades, especially after extensive liberalization as a consequence of 
the fall of the Iron Curtain. Additionally, the periods of consolidation in the budgets of 
the U.S. under the Clinton administration and the UK induced innovations in the fi-
nancial markets to provide for alternative investment products. These developments 
strengthened the leverage effects and enlarged credit potentials in the private sector. 
Increasingly risky financial products accompanied by the introduction of the new cur-
rency in Europe (the euro) led to the financial crisis, in which the exploding public 
debt in the eurozone has contributed additional risks to an already gloomy prospect.
lIquIdIty And the crIsIs In fInAncIAl mArkets
Beginning in the early 1990s, growing rents in the raw-material-producing countries 
particularly flooded the international financial markets, which had just been almost 
totally liberated after the 1990 change. Additionally a long period of strong econom-
ic growth was observed in the emerging brics (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa). The raw-material-producing and emerging countries were not able to 
absorb all the export surpluses in their own countries, so their governments and/or 
banks looked for profitable investments especially in the highly developed industri-
al nations. Alternative investment in the really needy developing countries (often 
“fragile states”) (Petersen, 2010) did not take place because of a supposedly lack of 
“investment security,” so their growth remained comparatively moderate.  
Figure 1 demonstrates that since the beginning of the 1990s, the savings rates of 
the oil-exporting and emerging economies strongly increased, while those in the ad-
vanced economies slowly decreased. Figure 2 shows that the decline of the savings 
rate has been especially sharp in Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom. While the 
U.S. savings rate also fell to about one percent in 2005, it recovered after the 2007/2008 
collapse.
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Figure 1
GROSS SAVING RATE DYNAMICS AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP
Figure 2
HOUSEHOLD GROSS SAVINGS RATE IN ADVANCED ECONOMIES 
AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP
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Both figures give clear hints that the excess of savings over desired investment 
in the past two decades was absorbed in the highly developed countries, the U.S. 
and European Union member states.3 Here, investment predominantly went into 
new financial products and government bonds. The excess liquidity and the cheap 
money policy in the U.S. and Europe established the questionable incentive for re-
ducing savings in the high developed countries and increasing their foreign debt. 
fInAncIAl InnovAtIons And shAdow bAnkIng
The low-interest policy of the Federal Reserve System (Fed) and the European Cen-
tral Bank (ecb) consequently caused strongly decreasing rates of return on govern-
ment bonds so that international investors on the global financial markets searched 
for profitable investment at higher rates of return, ignoring the fact that higher rates 
of return are only possible by taking higher risk positions. Here, financial innova-
tions came into play. Numerous new financial products were invented to attract the 
excess supply of capital:
 — single securitizations (e.g., asset-backed securities [abs])
— multiple securitizations (e.g., collateralized debt obligations [cdo])
— securitization-based derivatives (e.g., credit default swaps [cds])
— re-securitization and re-hypothecation.
Additionally, new financial institutions emerged or have greatly gained in in-
fluence. Conventional or commercial banking was supplemented by a shadow bank-
ing system (market-based financial institutions like hedge funds, structured investment 
vehicles, investment banks, private equity funds, money market funds, insurers, 
etc.), which conduct credit transformation outside national banking regulations and 
accords (e.g., Basel I and II). The financial innovations as well as the new financial 
institutions were becoming increasingly complex so that information about the real 
risk structures of the different investment products was more or less hidden. This 
was especially true for multiple securitization structures, where even experts were 
not able to evaluate the products’ quality. This has been demonstrated by false eval-
uations by the rating agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, Fitch Rating), interest-
ingly all U.S. private companies. Obviously there has been no product liability for 
3  For a critical analysis of “excess saving” see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009; Serven and Nguyen, 2010; and Borio 
and Disyatat, 2011.
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financial products either on the national or the international level, while product li-
ability for industrial products is very stringent even internationally.
The empirical development in the U.S., which significantly contributed to the 
financial crisis of 2007/2008, is shown in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 demonstrates that 
since 1985, the shadow banking system (supplying the “financial innovations”) was 
increasingly important. The growth of largely unregulated abs issuers outpaced the 
growth of regulated conventional banks’ security emissions; in 2008, the volume of 
the shadow banking sector reached its peak with about US$20 trillion compared to the 
conventional banking sector with about US$11 trillion. 
Figure 3
GROWTH OF SECURITY EMISSIONS IN U.S. FINANCIAL SECTORS
1 abs issuers include conduits such as special-purpose vehicles.
Source: Federal Reserve Board (2011) and Wiegelmann (2013).
The so-called true-sale securitizations are divided into the conventional abss 
and collateralized debt obligations (cdos). Conventional abss consist of broadly di-
versified and homogenous credits; their credit worthiness can usually be estimated 
by actuarial mathematics. However, cdo is an umbrella term for structured bonds, 
collateralized by much more heterogeneous assets like credits of private companies 
partly traded on the stock exchange, illiquid property, real estate credits (collateral-
ized mortgage obligations or cmos), payment requests for automobile loans, credit 
200
150
100
50
0
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
(Growth) Financial
crises
ABS Issuers1 GSEs
Money Market Funds Broker Dealers
Convertional Banks
In
de
xe
d 
G
ro
w
th
 R
at
e:
 1
75
 ti
m
es
 fo
r A
BS
 Is
su
er
s
90
Hans-GeorG Petersen and alexander Martin WieGelMann
norteaMérica
card loans, student loans, consumer credit, public debt titles, etc. Additionally cdos 
themselves have been securitized again (re- or even multiple-securitization), so that 
for investors the risk structures were usually totally hidden. Figure 4 represents the 
breakdown of true-value securitizations in the U.S. and their development since 1985. 
The figure illustrates that until the financial crises, subprime mortgages permanently 
gained in importance, and the same is true for the cdos. However, especially highly 
complex and risky products dominated the market for true-sale securitizations.
Figure 4
BREAKDOWN OF U.S. TRUE-SALE SECURITIZATIONS
1 Especially cdos.
Source: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (2011) and Wiegelmann (2013).
Hence, established mechanisms for efficient individual risk management were 
no longer useful. At least the higher yield for some of the products was a rough hint 
that the risks involved were steadily increasing. And all this happened without any 
information or warnings to investors. Liability and responsibility considerations ob-
viously did not exist on the side of the product innovators and no product recall –as it is 
usual for defective products in the industrial and consumption goods sectors– has 
ever happened.
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euro ImplementAtIon, the crIsIs of credIts, 
And explodIng publIc debt
Parallel to this period of product innovations on financial markets and the U.S. cheap 
money policy to overcome the 2000 explosion of the dot-com bubble (collapse of the 
“New Market”), the European currency zone was implemented. The cheap money 
policy is reflected in the development of the federal funds rate, shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5
U.S. FEDERAL FUNDS RATE (1952-2012)
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2012).
The federal funds rate decreased steadily from the 1980s on (also reflecting de-
clining inflation rates) and almost reached zero percent in the crisis years 2007/2008.
The crisis of credits emerged in several steps:
—  The aggressive subprime mortgage policy of the U.S. shadow banking system 
(including European subsidiary companies, like Deutsche Bank and many 
German “Landesbanken”) led to lower lending standards and high-risk mort-
gage products (like adjustable-rate mortgages);
—  The limitation of mortgage liability on housing in the U.S.; there is no joint 
and several liability for individuals like in many European countries;4
4 The slogan is, “Drop off your keys at the bank and get rid of the liability!”
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—  Malfunctioning of rating agencies that overlooked the massive problems, es-
pecially in the shadow banking system;
—  The real estate bubble (Ponzi or pyramid scheme) as a consequence of care-
less or even irresponsible policies and investment behavior;
—  Breakdown of the overheated real estate markets in the U.S. and Europe as 
well as the collapse of the shadow banking system;
—  Infection of commercial banks and insurance companies, which held value-
less securities (especially cdos);
—  Overreaction of the rating agencies in down-grading the government debt 
titles in the U.S. and Europe;
—  Collapse of real economic activities in single countries accompanied by sig-
nificant monetary and fiscal policy reactions;
—  Decreasing Gdp and increasing interest payments on government debt in-
duced enormous budget deficits;
—  The enormous increase in refunding needs in some EU member states caused 
even stronger rising interest rates;
— Individual countries came close to bankruptcy (Giipsc);
— Crisis of confidence in the euro system;
— Implementation of financial rescue-parachutes.
Keeping in mind the development in the eurozone, the implementation of the 
euro, especially the convergence process before the implementation phase, reduced 
inflation and improved stability in most of the participating EU member states. Figure 
6 demonstrates that the process to introduce the euro had an enormous impact on in-
terest rates in the countries of the eurozone; we chose the net yields of 10-year govern-
ment bonds as an example. It becomes obvious that the euro implementation dramati-
cally reduced interest payments on government bonds especially in the Giipsc states. In 
the year of the introduction of the cash euro, 2002, interest rates in almost all member 
states of the zone dropped to the German level. And the spread in between the interest 
rates remained very close until the beginning of the crisis in the first half of 2007.
Therefore, the implementation of the euro led to a strong decrease in interest 
structures in all the member countries with the exception of Germany, which already 
had very moderate interest rates due to the Deutsche Bundesbank’s stringent mon-
etary policy. This decline in national interest payments worked like a business stim-
ulus package, which caused a boom at least in some member countries, whereas 
Germany remained in stagnation until the measures of the Agenda 2010 developed 
their full positive impacts.
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The low interest rates have not only influenced economic activities in the mem-
ber countries, but also induced the governments to increase their public debt be-
cause of the cheap money that flooded international financial markets. As a conse-
quence, foreign debt dramatically increased, which at least for a certain period was 
hidden because of the continuing moderate interest payments in public budgets. But 
if the public debt exceeds a level of between 60 and 80 percent in relation to Gdp, in-
creasing interest rates usually cause a dramatic hike in the interest payments so that 
exploding budget deficits surface. Hence, these developments induced an increased 
heterogeneity in the eurozone and the EU. A process of divergence of economic indi-
cators, especially internal inflation rates, began.
Since 2007/2008, these processes have step by step and much too slowly been 
internalized by the rating agencies, which abruptly changed their policies and si-
multaneously caused a sudden collapse of trust in governments’ ability to manage 
such a crisis. The reflection on the international financial markets was an explosion 
of the risk component in compound interest rates, which also happened in the euro-
zone and is depicted in Figure 6 as well.
Citizens in the Giipsc countries increased consumption levels even more, bought 
goods and services in the few stable countries in the eurozone (Finland, Germany, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands), and a real exodus of capital from the Giipsc states 
Figure 6
NET YIELD OF 10-YEAR GOVERNMENT BONDS IN SOME EUROZONE STATES
Source: Wikimedia Commons (2012). 
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to the stable states occurred. This is clearly expressed in the so-called target2 balanc-
es, which reflect the imbalances of services and capital movements of the single 
member states.5 Figure 7 shows how, since summer 2007, the formerly negligible 
target2 balances practically exploded and reached their peak in July/August 2012. 
Since then, the maximum gap, especially between Germany and Spain but also vis-à-
vis the other member states of the eurozone, has diminished slightly.
Figure 7
ECB TARGET 2 BALANCES (BILLIONS OF EUROS)
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The slight reversal trend in the target2 balances since fall 2012 is also reflected in 
the development of government bonds’ net yield. The implementation of the Euro-
pean financial rescue parachutes (Security Market Program [smp] of the ecb, European 
Fiscal Stability Facility [efsf], European Stability Mechanism [esm], European Fiscal 
Compact [efc], European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism [efsm]) have obviously 
temporarily calmed down the actors on the international financial markets so that 
long-term interest rates have also dropped –with some interruptions– since fall 2012 
(see Figure 8). 
5 For more details on the target 2 balances see, for example, Sinn (2012).
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Figure 8
LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES IN THE EUROZONE
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Only the future will tell if the political measures being implemented will be suf-
ficient or not. An economic policy in the individual member countries that reduces 
public deficits and the interest burden in budgets seems to be the only feasible course 
for consolidating and gaining back the trust in national governments. All the discus-
sions on growth enhancements up to now have been pure rhetoric, because nobody 
has been able to explain how such programs can be financed without endangering 
the future again – despite the fact that such concrete programs are badly lacking.
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InstItutIonAl economIcs As A bAckground explAnAtIon
Economic theory helps to explain what went wrong especially in the last two or three 
decades of real life. The aforementioned approaches of institutional economics like 
the principal-agent problem (pap) are of utmost relevance as is demonstrated in the 
following section.
As long as management only relies on equity capital, no paps exist for the most 
part. Even if the entrepreneur has limited information (especially about future trends), 
he/she develops his/her own expectations based on experience and arrives at his/her 
own management decisions regarding expected risks. In the simple neoclassical setting, 
he/she tries to maximize his/her profits, assuring or even broadening his/her equity 
capital basis. He/She is interested in sustainable development and even voluntarily 
internalizes negative external effects, following the rules of fairness (in a Rawlsian sense) 
and even ensuring inter-generational responsibility in a familial as well as societal con-
text; he/she is acting as a decent tradesman (“ehrbarer Kaufmann”), which in the Ger-
man literature forms the basis for the concept of corporate social responsibility (Klink, 
2008). This idealized context has to be compared with modern economic structures, 
where sole-traders and small enterprises still exist but borrowed capital and complex 
organizational structures play a dominant role. Borrowed capital often changes the con-
ditions for responsible behavior because borrowed capital was formed from the savings 
of third persons. This alone might influence an investor’s risk-taking attitudes.
The background for such a behavioral impact is the so-called leverage effect, 
which reflects the level of borrowed capital. Usually the return on equity in a firm is 
higher than the market interest rate (the so-called risk-free interest rate).  If an inves-
tor can earn 10-percent interest on an investment in his/her own firm and the market 
interest rate is just 5 percent, borrowing is rational because the profit is increased by 
the 5 percent of the investment financed from borrowed capital. If this profit is added 
to the profit on the equity capital, the return on equity increases from 10 percent at 
assumed 100 000 currency units of equity capital and zero borrowed capital to 15 per-
cent at 50 000 currency units of equity capital, to even 30 percent at 20 000 currency 
units of equity capital to infinite at zero equity capital (see Figure 9). The leverage ef-
fect is even boosted if the excess equity capital can be invested in similar investment 
projects that offer the same return. At an equity investment of 10 000 currency units 
per investment, 10 investment projects of 100 000 currency units each can be financed 
so that the profit increases from 10 000 currency units in the case of 100-percent equity 
financing to 55 000 currency units in the case of 10-percent equity financing. Therefore, 
it seems rational to employ borrowed capital, but this use is connected with substan-
tial risks dependent on the equity/borrowed capital ratio.
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The entrepreneur is always confronted with the risk that his/her return on equi-
ty might not be sustainable but could decrease in the future. In the case of using bor-
rowed capital, an additional risk arises: if the rate of return declines, the borrower can 
no longer service the debt (interest payment and amortization of the borrowed capi-
tal). Now it depends on the risk expectations and evaluation of the single entrepre-
neur if the input of borrowed capital changes his/her attitudes about risk taking. 
Long-term experience and some empirical evidence seem to prove that the input of 
debt capital increases the willingness to take higher risks especially in cases where 
limited liability exists (e.g., limited liability companies and joint stock companies).
Figure 9
EQUITY CAPITAL, BORROWED CAPITAL, AND RETURN ON EQUITY
Source: Own calculations.
The input of borrowed capital combined with limited liability arrangements al-
ready sets incentives for investors to take more risks than in the case of full equity 
financing. If then the intrinsic motivation stemming from ethical paradigms like the 
“decent tradesman” is buried in oblivion and no longer communicated as a leading 
image, the obstacles for risk-taking behavior are eroded more and more. 
As long as many economists are of the opinion that morality and ethics are just 
problems of philosophy and not part of daily economic life, it is no wonder that critical 
developments in our societies are coming to the surface and into people’s conscious-
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ness. Since the very beginning of the theory of economic thought, economists have 
been fully aware that serious market failures do exist, which must be overcome by ef-
ficient governmental regulation. But if market failures are not cured and then are ac-
companied by moral failures of the agents acting in the markets (the suppliers and 
demanders of goods and services),6 the entire social and economic system could even 
be jeopardized. Only efficient government regulations (“good governance”) and educa-
tion in fundamental values can prevent us from such catastrophes.
Another risk for spreading moral failures is to be seen in the complex economic 
structures that exist in modern economic systems. The sole trader and the personal 
entrepreneur relying on equity capital and self-responsibility are still quite typical in 
some happy countries with a large sector of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(sme); but in all highly developed countries, big incorporated companies with so-
phisticated organizational structures dominate. For reasons of simplicity, Figure 10 
shows some of the complex governance relations.
If governance decisions are delegated to managers, in terms of modern institu-
tional economics, agents emerge who manage the owner’s equity capital or, in case 
of corporations, that of the shareholders, who are the principals in our approach. 
Principally the managers (or the board of directors or chief executive officers [ceos]) 
have to act in the interests of the shareholders to maximize the shareholders’ value. 
In social-market-oriented societies like Germany, stakeholders’ interests are also le-
gally ensured (“Mitbestimmungsgesetz” or Co-Determination Act; see Figure 10) to 
safeguard the common welfare obligation of private property. Then additional 
agents appear on the scene representing something other than the owners’ interests. 
Managers are not solely acting in the interest of shareholders, but developing strong 
interests of their own, especially interests to maximize their own wealth. In extreme 
cases, these interests become dominant so that the equity capital bases of the share-
holders may even be destroyed (exploitation of the shareholders by the manage-
ment). But this is only one pap; many others are also involved. 
Trade union officials, whose main task is to represent the interests of employees 
(who are the principals in that relationship), also develop their own incentives, 
which may conflict with those of their clients. Certainly, a trade union representative 
in a supervisory board or even a board of directors develops his/her own interest 
for higher remuneration. Also, numerous paps can be involved in the relationships 
between supervisory board, shareholders, and managers. Hence, complex gover-
nance structures are inevitably connected with multi-stage paps.
6  Markets are just societal instruments like ethics; if the agents (suppliers and/or demanders) on the markets 
are acting immorally, market outcomes will be immoral, too. For details see Petersen (1993: 128, 138).
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Figure 10
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE IN GERMANY
A specific example of a collapse of corporate social responsibility can be seen in 
the previously described crisis of the financial markets (for details see Petersen 
[2012c]).  As already mentioned, a modern, efficient financial sector steered by re-
sponsible financial managers acting in the interests of capital owners but also in their 
own personal interests remains an important target of national and international eco-
nomic policy. The abolishment of capital transaction controls, the globalization pro-
cess itself, and the implementation of information technologies broadened financial 
markets, created new financial products, and gave rise to new types of financial insti-
tutions, less or almost completely unregulated by national supervisory authorities. 
Investment traders and bank managers on short-term contracts misused their 
mandates predominantly in their own income and property interests and conse-
quently destroyed trust in the financial system, with far reaching consequences for 
future development. And all that happened despite the fact that all these institu-
tions, whether private, partly in a public-private-partnership (ppp), or totally public, 
had ethical guidelines and corporate social responsibility declarations in their com-
pany presentations.7
7  See, for example, Deutsche Bank’s internet presentation (n.d.), This has not prevented Deutsche Bank’s ceos 
and asset managers from playing a very questionable role during the subprime mortgage hype in the U.S. 
See the 2012  Der Spiegel exposé.
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Therefore, complexity must be reduced, transparency increased, and information 
systems substantially improved. Managers have to be reminded of the guiding prin-
cipal of a decent tradesman, so they follow the obligations of corporate social respon-
sibility once again. They need to internalize the traditional knowledge that finance 
and banking depend on the clients’ trust in the monetary system. This allows principals 
to regain control over the system and redevelop the necessary trust which is indis-
pensable for future growth and welfare. But this recovery has to be accompanied by 
more efficient public (macro-prudential) regulation, which must be implemented 
globally even by countries like the U.S. and the UK, where the reluctance to take such 
measures is still much too strong.
conclusIons
Both the economic and political systems urgently need efficient rules and regulations, 
which have been extensively discussed in political and economic theory. The neces-
sary technical conditions are more or less obvious today because positive examples 
exist. But even in these cases, serious shortcomings prevail, as the 2007/2008 world 
financial crisis demonstrated. The predominantly well-known technical conditions 
often do not function because human beings display serious shortcomings with re-
gard to the internalization –or internalize insufficiently– of the underlying value sys-
tem. This is due to the fact that in many discussions technical conditions predomi-
nate, while the ethical foundations often remain ambiguous. Almost every corpora-
tion has its own csr guidelines, which all sound quite convincing and are usually part 
of the company presentation. But this often remains a pure marketing strategy with 
no consequences in real actions. The most prominent example is the behavior of the 
managers as agents of banks and insurance companies, who should be fully aware 
that financial markets only function in the long run when the respective actors trust 
each other and are also sufficiently trusted by the public. The system inevitably col-
lapses if this trust is destroyed. That has not hindered most agents from behaving like 
lemmings to protect their self-interest over their principals’ interests. Certainly, short-
term work contracts created some questionable negative incentives, but there has 
also been massive criminal impetus.
If one discusses with the predominantly young financial brokers and traders, it 
becomes obvious that their motivation is very similar to that which dominates in 
another field of daily life: professional sports. They want to earn the highest return 
in the shortest possible period –most of the leading international soccer clubs are al-
most bankrupt. The international financial system is not a casino, and “casino capi-
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talism” (Sinn, 2009) as executed in recent years destroys the very basis of democrat-
ic, market-oriented free societies. What is badly needed is a general outcry for a new 
ethical foundation of politics and economics even in our highly developed countries 
and all over the world. If computers and mathematical algorithms replace human 
beings in financial markets –this is called electronic trading and banking–, not sur-
prisingly, social responsibility has fallen victim to technical progress. But this techni-
cal progress destroys the very basis of our societies. We have to reduce complexity 
and develop more skepticism about easy, quasi-automatic solutions. 
The lessons one can learn from the last financial crises are manifold. The financial 
sector as part of the service sector has developed too strong self-interests expressed in 
extraordinary rates of returns, salaries, and bonuses: the self-interest of agents prevail 
over the ownership interests of principals. Therefore, the financial sector’s role has 
become more and more relevant, almost displacing not only the owners’ interests but 
also political influences. The financial sector has to be reduced to its classical role of 
serving the real economy regulated by strong national states and international organi-
zations. Agents in the financial sector must follow a personally binding code of con-
duct so that the people’s trust in financial institutions is safeguarded and not sacrificed 
for short-term individual advantages.
Most importantly, arbitrage and speculation are often instruments to improve 
market conditions and move toward equilibrium. Hence, speculation in financial mar-
kets may positively impact goods markets and increase welfare. In the case of asym-
metric information and excessive power on the supply side, agents are able to induce 
price hikes by artificially increasing demand, as happened with subprime mortgag-
es before the 2007/2008 crises. Underlying Ponzi schemes evoke price bubbles,8 
which eventually burst and might even destroy formerly well-functioning markets. 
Crashes of financial markets can infect goods markets and drag the real sector into 
recession. This kind of speculation destroys well-being; therefore, countermeasures 
have to be implemented in the form of macro-prudential solutions for monetary policy 
and regulation.
But agents’ long-term self-interests should also be directed against welfare-de-
stroying speculation. In spite of the fact that the media has named some “heroes” as 
having first detected the coming financial market crash, almost every merely reason-
ably informed economist had all the necessary information about the fundamental 
disequilibrium in the U.S. mortgage system and beyond. But this knowledge did not 
stop agents from blowing the bubble up as long as possible because their intrinsic 
motivation was dominated by false incentives. Therefore, financial experts should 
8 For examples of price bubbles see Van Boening, Williams, and LaMaster (1993).
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put more effort into developing strategies that in the future will safeguard the stabil-
ity of national as well as international financial markets. What is important is no long-
er innovations of new complex financial products important, but rather the imple-
mentation of corrective measures, which will serve the long-term interests of the 
clients so that trust in the financial sector is restored. Such measures include quality 
labels for financial products, certifications, international product liability, and reli-
able, re-producible, and independent rating procedures. Liability and product recall 
by issuers would be clear signals of the degree of reliability (and the risks involved) 
and would improve transparency. Hence, consumers’ protection is in line with the 
fundamental self-interests of financial agents because it ensures the long-term func-
tioning of the markets. Voluntary product guarantees are a form of micro-prudential 
regulation corresponding to csr obligations and substituting the need for much strong-
er regulatory measures by state authorities.
The concentration process within the financial sector has to be stopped by appro-
priate regulation to secure sufficient competition among the different institutions of 
the banking and insurance sector. Orienting exclusively to big clients (large enter-
prises or rich individuals) has to be corrected in favor of a banking and insurance 
scheme in which the average citizen is the focus of financial services. A combination 
of savings, cooperative, and private banks is of utmost relevance. The old German 
“house bank” system has been a good example. Private clients and firms have orga-
nized their debit and credit relations using a single bank, and the bank managers were 
perfectly informed about their credit risks independently of other agents (like the rat-
ing agencies). The Basel Accords have partly destroyed this system, which is of special 
value for the sme sector. But in the meantime, at least the smaller financial institutions 
have realized that while such a system may lead to a decreasing rate of return, it also 
increases safety in investments through trust.
Hence, the sme sector needs corresponding small and medium-sized banks (smb), 
with managers closely connected to the clients and familiar with their individual 
risk profiles. Manifold securitization brings enormous information losses and the 
risk of misuse. Multi-agent systems formed by shadow banks and rating agencies 
suffer from serious paps, difficult to control adequately by governmental regulation. 
The influence of misled, inadequately-controlled agents contributes to speculative 
bubbles and pyramid and avalanche effects so that the fundamental economic data are 
no longer of relevance for stock markets and firms’ capitalization. Short-term specu-
lative interests then endanger the long-term well-being of whole societies.
In developing and emerging countries, smes as well as smbs must be supported 
in the development process until they form the backbone of the economy and dis-
play sustainable business models. Conventional banking methods have to be com-
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bined with modern financial products, which must be characterized by an adequate 
rate of return and a transparent risk/reward ratio. Cooperative credit institutions 
acting in the interest of bank clients are also a promising approach for limiting the 
influence and the concentration within the globalizing market. This mainly creates 
advantages even for smaller lenders to gain access to international capital and to over-
come situations of national capital shortages. But just as important as an efficient smb 
system is citizens’ trust or mistrust in the national system of governance.
Last but not least, the European currency system will only survive if the leading 
politicians in the eurozone are courageous enough to emancipate themselves from 
the U.S. and the UK, both of which obviously have different interests and concepts of 
the role of financial markets in their respective economic systems. Europe badly 
needs a financial architecture of its own to separate risk profiles into conventional 
banking, investment banking, and high-risk areas, in which the super-rich can play in 
the “casino style.” Of utmost importance is monetary policy returning to a “sound 
policy” that guarantees a positive real interest rate in the medium- and long-term per-
s pective. Only at a positive real interest rate are the necessary savings incentives set 
for individuals, who are required to overcome the problems of demographic change by 
partly capital-funded insurance schemes. The future of social security in our societies 
is jeopardized without a strong compound-interest effect in the private and public 
insurance schemes. Therefore, as soon as possible, the ecb has to change its current 
cheap-money policy.
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